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Abstract—Due to physical isolation as well as use of proprietary
hardware and protocols, traditional real-time systems (RTS) were
considered to be invulnerable to security breaches and external
attacks. However, this assumption is being challenged by recent
attacks that highlight the vulnerabilities in such systems. In
this paper, we focus on integrating security mechanisms into
RTS (especially legacy RTS) and provide a metric to measure
the effectiveness of such mechanisms. We combine opportunistic
execution with hierarchical scheduling to maintain compatibility
with legacy systems while still providing flexibility. The proposed
approach is shown to increase the security posture of RTS systems
without impacting their temporal constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Real-time Systems (RTS) are everywhere. Embedded RTS
are used for monitoring and controlling physical systems and
processes in varied domains, e.g., aircraft including Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), submarines, other vehicles (both
autonomous as well as manual), critical infrastructures (e.g.,
power grids and water systems), spacecraft and industrial
plants to name but a few. These systems rely on a variety of
inputs for their correct operation and have to meet stringent
safety and timing requirements. However, until recently, cyber-
security considerations were an afterthought in the design
of such systems. While fault-tolerance has been a design
consideration, traditional fault-tolerance techniques that were
designed to counter and survive random or accidental faults are
not sufficient to deal with cyber-attacks. Given the increasing
cyber-attack risks, it is essential to integrate resilience against
such attacks into RTS design and to retrofit existing critical
RTS with detection, survival and recovery mechanisms. How-
ever, any such mechanisms have to co-exist with the real-time
tasks in the system and have to operate without impacting
the timing and safety constraints of the control logic. This
creates an apparent tension, especially in the case of legacy
systems – between security requirements (e.g., having enough
cycles for effective detection) as well as the timing and safety
requirements. Further, any detection mechanism has to be
designed so that an adversary cannot easily evade it.
The stringent timing constraints in hard real-time systems
introduce additional complexities for the implementation of
cyber-security mechanisms; e.g., the strict deadlines for the
completion of periodic hard real-time systems may not allow
for additional execution by the security mechanisms. Unlike
conventional IT security solutions, it may not be possible to
execute the security tasks for arbitrary periods of time. This is
because, not only must the security mechanisms work properly
but they must also not interfere with the deadlines of real-time
tasks.
Our goal is to improve RTS security posture by integrating
security mechanisms without violating real-time constraints.
The security routines could be any intrusion detection and
recovery mechanism depending on the system requirements.
As an example, let us consider an open source intrusion de-
tection mechanism, Tripwire1, that detects integrity violations
in the system. It stores clean system state during initialization
and uses it later to detect intrusions by comparing the current
system state against the stored clean values. As we show in
Table I, the default configuration of Tripwire contains several
tasks, viz., protecting its own binary files, protecting system
binary and library files, ensuring kernel and process integrity
etc.
While integrating security mechanisms into a practical sys-
tem, the following performance criteria need to be considered.
i) Monitoring Frequency: In order to provide best protection,
the security tasks need to be executed quite often. If
the interval between consecutive monitoring events is too
large, the adversary may harm the system undetected
between two invocations of the security task. On the other
hand, if the security tasks are executed very frequently,
it may impact the schedulability of the real-time tasks.
Herein lies an important trade-off between monitoring
frequency and schedulability.
ii) Responsiveness: In some circumstances, a security task
may need to complete with less interference from higher-
priority tasks. As an example, let us consider the scenario
where a security breach is suspected. In such an event
the security task may be required to perform more fine-
grained checking instead of waiting for its next sporadic
slot. This may cause some low-priority non-critical real-
time tasks to miss their deadlines. However, the schedul-
ing policy needs to ensure that the system remains secure
without violating real-time constraints for critical, high-
priority, real-time tasks.
iii) Atomicity: Depending on the operation, some of the se-
curity tasks may need to be executed without preemption.
1http://www.tripwire.com/.
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TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF SECURITY TASKS FOR INTRUSION DETECTION IN LINUX-BASED RTOS*
Task Function Criticality Execution Time
Check IDS own binary (IDS bin) Scan (e.g., compare hash value) files in the follow-
ing locations: /usr/sbin/siggen, /usr/sbin/tripwire ,
/usr/sbin/twadmin, /usr/sbin/twprint
High
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WCET (cycle counts)
Check critical executables (FS bin) Scan file-system binary (e.g., /bin, /sbin) High
Check critical libraries (FS lib) Scan file-system library (e.g., /lib) High
Check device and kernel (Ker) Scan peripherals and kernel information in the /dev and /proc
directory
High
Check configuration files (Conf) Scan changes in the configuration files (e.g., /etc) Medium
*We use Linux kernel version 3.10.32 with real-time patch, e.g., Real-Time Application Interface (RTAI) [1] version 4.1. The execution
times are measured using read time-stamp counter (RDTSC) [2] instruction.
For instance, let us consider a security task that scans
the process table and has been preempted in the middle
of its operation. An adversary may corrupt the process
table entry that has already been scanned before the next
scheduling point of the security task. When the security
tasks are rescheduled, it will start scanning from its last
state and may not be able to detect the changes in a timely
manner.
In this paper we focus mainly on the monitoring fre-
quency criterion2. However, we highlight how our proposed
framework can be extended to incorporate responsiveness and
atomicity in Section VIII. In particular, we consider incorpo-
rating security mechanisms by implementing them as separate
sporadic tasks. This brings up the challenge of determining
the ‘right’ periods for the security tasks. For instance, some
critical security routines may be required to execute more
frequently than others. However, if the period is too short (e.g.,
the security task repeats too often) then it will use too much
of the processor time and eventually lower the overall system
utilization. As a result, the security mechanism itself might
prove to be a hindrance to the system and reduce the overall
functionality or worse, safety. On the other hand, if the period
is too long, the security task may not always detect violations
since attacks could be launched between two instances of the
security task.
Therefore, we propose a framework that allows the exe-
cution of security tasks opportunistically with lower-priority
than real-time tasks, while keeping the best possible periods
for the security tasks that ensure all the tasks in the system
remain schedulable. The main contribution of this paper can
be summarized as follows:
• We introduce an extensible framework that allows the se-
curity tasks to execute without perturbing scheduling or-
der and timing constraints of the real-time tasks (Section
VI). In doing so, we formulate a constraint optimization
problem and solve it using Geometric Programming (GP)
approach in polynomial time (Sections III-V).
• We propose a metric to measure the security posture of
the system in terms of frequency of periodic execution
(Section III).
2As the other two imply changing the schedule of real-time tasks which in
most cases is not feasible with legacy systems.
• We evaluate the proposed approach for schedulability and
security (Section VII).
Key mathematical notations used in the paper are listed in
Table II.
TABLE II
MATHEMATICAL NOTATIONS
Notation Interpretation
ΓR , ΓS Set of real-time and security tasks, respectively
m , n Number of real-time and security tasks, respectively
Ci, Di, Ti Worst-case execution time, deadline, and period of
task τi, respectively
hp(τi) Set of tasks that has higher priority than τi
T desi , T
max
i Desired and maximum allowable period of the se-
curity task τi ∈ ΓS , respectively
ωi Weighting factor of the security task τi ∈ ΓS
S(Q,P ) Security server with capacity Q and replenishment
period P
τS The task represents the security server S(Q,P )
with capacity Q and replenishment period P
UBS(Q,P ),ΓS Utilization bound for the given server parameters
S(Q,P ) and security task-set ΓS
∆S Worst case interference to the security server by the
real-time tasks
Ii Worst-case workload generated by the τi and
hp(τi) from critical instance to deadline of τi
lsbfS(t) Linear lower-bound supply function of the security
server during time interval t
II. SYSTEM AND SECURITY MODEL
A. Real-Time Tasks and Scheduling Model
We consider a uni-processor system consisting of a
set of m fixed-priority3 sporadic real-time tasks ΓR =
{τ1, τ2, · · · , τm}. Each real-time task τi ∈ ΓR is characterized
by (Ci, Ti, Di), where Ci worst-case execution time (WCET),
Ti is the minimum inter-arrival time (or period) between
successive releases and Di is the relative deadline. We assume
that priorities are distinct and the tasks have implicit deadline,
e.g., Di = Ti for ∀i ∈ ΓR. For the simplicity of notation we
use the same symbol τi to denote a task’s jobs.
Let hp(τi) denote the set of tasks that have higher pri-
ority than τi. We assume that the real-time task-set ΓR is
schedulable by a fixed-priority preemptive scheduling. Since
3We assume that task priority assignment follows Rate Monotonic (RM)
[3] algorithm.
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the task-set is schedulable, for each task τi ∈ ΓR, the worst-
case response time wi is less than or equal to the deadline Di.
Hence, the following inequity is satisfied for all tasks τi ∈ ΓR
[4], [5]:
wi = Ci +
∑
τh∈hp(τi)
⌈
rki
Th
⌉
· Ch ≤ Di (1)
where r0i = Ci and wi = rk+1i = rki for some k.
B. Security Model
RTS face threats in various forms depending on the sys-
tem and the goals of an adversary. For instance, adversaries
may eavesdrop on, insert or modify messages exchanged by
RTS; they may manipulate the sensor inputs being processed;
the adversary could try to modify the control flow of the
system; glean sensitive information through side channels
etc. The goals of adversaries may range from simply lodging
themselves in the system and stealthily learning sensitive
information to actively taking control and manipulating or
crashing the system.
Threats to communications are usually dealt with by in-
tegrating cryptographic protection mechanisms. From an RTS
perspective this increases the WCET of existing real-time tasks
and has been studied in literature [6], [7]. In contrast, our focus
is on threats that can be dealt with by integrating additional
security tasks. For example, a sensor measurement correlation
task may be added for detecting sensor manipulation or a
change detection task may be added to detect changes or
intrusions into the system. The addition of such tasks may
necessitate changing the schedule of real-time tasks as was
the case in [8], [9] where a state cleansing task was added to
deal with stealthy adversaries gleaning sensitive information
through side channels. In this work we focus on situations
where added security tasks are not allowed to impact the
schedule of existing real-time tasks as is often the case when
integrating security into legacy systems. However, we do
discuss the extensiblity of our approach to scenarios when
some changes may be allowed.
C. Security Tasks
Our goal is to ensure security of the system without
perturbing the scheduling order and timing constraint (e.g.,
Eq. (1)) of the real-time tasks. As mentioned earlier, we
ensure security of the system by integrating additional security
tasks. Let us denote the security tasks by the set ΓS =
{τ1, τ2, · · · , τn}. Each security task τi ∈ ΓS is characterized
by (Ci, T desi , Tmaxi , ωi), where Ci is the WCET, T desi is
the most desired period between successive releases (hence
F desi =
1
Tdes
i
is the desired execution frequency of security
routine), and Tmaxi is the maximum allowable period beyond
which security checking by τi may not be effective. The
parameter ωi > 0 is a designer given weighting factor, that
may reflect the criticality of the security task τi. More critical
security tasks would have larger wi. For example, as illustrated
in Table I, the default configuration of Tripwire has different
criticality levels, e.g., High (critical files that are significant
points of vulnerability), Medium (non-critical files that are of
significant security impact) etc.
Any period Ti within the range T desi ≤ Ti ≤ Tmaxi would
be acceptable. The actual period Ti, however, is not known
a priori and our goal is to find the suitable period for the
security tasks without violating the real-time constraints. We
assume that the security tasks also have implicit deadline, e.g.,
Di = Ti for ∀τi ∈ ΓS that implies security tasks should
complete before its next period.
III. PERIOD ADAPTATION
A simple approach to ensure security without perturbing
real-time scheduling order is to execute security tasks as lower
priority than real-time tasks. Hence, the security routines will
be executing only during slack times when no other higher-
priority real time tasks are running. However, one fundamental
problem is to determine which security tasks will be running
when to provide better defense against certain vulnerabilities.
As mentioned earlier, actual period of the security tasks is
unknown and we need to adapt the periods within acceptable
ranges to achieve better trade-off between schedulabily and
defense against security breaches. In what follows, we formu-
late the period adaptation problem to ensure security tasks can
execute close to their desired frequency.
A. Problem Description
We measure the security of the system by means of the
achievable periodic monitoring. Let Ti be the period of the
security task τi ∈ ΓS that needs to be determined. Our goal
is to minimize the perturbation between the achievable period
Ti and the desired period T desi . Hence we define the metric
ηi =
T desi
Ti
(2)
that denotes the tightness of the frequency of periodic moni-
toring for the security task τi and bounded by T
des
i
Tmax
i
≤ ηi ≤ 1.
The period adaptation problem is therefore to maximize the
tightness of the achievable periods of all the security tasks
without violating the schedulabulity as well as period bound
constraints of the security tasks. The formulation of the period
adaptation problem is explained in the following.
B. Formulation as an Optimization Problem
1) Objective Function: As mentioned earlier, the objective
of the period adaptation is to minimize the perturbation (e.g.,
maximize the tightness ηi) for all the security tasks. Mathe-
matically the objective function can be defined as follows:
max
T
η (3)
where η =
∑
τi∈ΓS
ωiηi =
∑
τi∈ΓS
ωi
Tdesi
Ti
is the cumulative
weighted tightness and the vector T = [T1, T2, · · · , Tn]T
represents the period of the tasks that need to be determined.
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2) Utilization Bound Constraint: Utilization of each secu-
rity task is an important measure since it reveals the amount
of processor dedicated to the security task and thus impacts
schedulability. Since we are executing security tasks in the idle
time, the following necessary condition ensures that utilization
of the security tasks are within the remaining utilization [3]:
∑
τi∈ΓS
Ci
Ti
≤ (m+ n)(2 1m+n − 1)−
∑
τj∈ΓR
Cj
Tj
. (4)
3) Period Bound Constraints: Since we consider that the
integrated system consisting of real-time and security tasks
will follow the RM priority order, the following constraint
needs to be satisfied
Ti ≥ T¯ ∀τi ∈ ΓS (5)
where T¯ = max
τj∈ΓR
Tj . Besides, in order to fulfill the restrictions
on periodic monitoring, the following inequality needs to be
satisfied for all the security tasks
T desi ≤ Ti ≤ Tmaxi ∀τi ∈ ΓS . (6)
Using the objective function in Eq. (3), and the set of
constraints in Eqs. (4), (5), and (6), we can formulate the pe-
riod adaptation problem as the following non-linear constraint
optimization problem.
(P1)
max
T
∑
τi∈ΓS
ωi
T desi
Ti
, Subject to: (4), (5), (6).
Although it is non-trivial to solve the above non-linear non-
convex optimization problem in its current form, it is possible
to transform P1 into a convex optimization problem using
an approach similar to that presented in this paper. However,
the analysis using the above formulation is limited by RM
bound and also the security task’s periods need to satisfy the
constraint in Eq. (5) to follow RM priority order. In addition,
rather than only focusing on optimizing the periods of the
security tasks, we aim to design a unified framework that
can achieve other security aspects (e.g., responsiveness and
atomicity). Hence, instead of simply running security tasks
by themselves in idle-time, we propose using a server to
execute the security tasks. With this approach, for instance,
if better responsiveness is desired from security mechanisms,
we could increase the priority of the server and allow the
server to execute until the security task finishes its desired
checking4. Not only will the server abstraction allow us to
provide better isolation between real-time and security tasks;
but it also enables us to integrate additional security properties
and provide better execution frequency for certain conditions
as we discuss in Sections VII and VIII.
4This issue is discussed further in Section VIII.
IV. THE SECURITY SERVER
The security server is an abstraction that provides execution
time to the security tasks, according to a preemptive fixed-
priority scheduling algorithm (e.g., RM). Instead of focusing
on any particular server algorithm, we consider a generic
server abstraction model. The security server S(Q,P ) is
characterized by the capacity Q and replenishment period P
and works as follows.
The server may be in two states, e.g., active and inactive and
executed with lowest-priority. If any security task is activated
at time t and if the server is inactive, then the server will
become active with capacity Q and relative deadline (e.g., next
replenishment time) is set as t + P . If the server is already
active, then the current capacity and relative deadline remain
unchanged. When the server is being scheduled, it executes the
security tasks according to its own scheduling policy; which
we consider fixed-priority RM scheduling in this work. While
a security task is executing, the current available capacity is
decremented accordingly. The server can be preempted by the
scheduler in order to serve the real-time tasks. When the server
is preempted, the currently available capacity is no longer
decremented. If the available capacity becomes zero and some
security task has not yet finished, then the server is suspended
until its next replenishment time. Let t′ be that replenishment
time. At time t′, the server is recharged to its full capacity Q,
the next replenishment time is set as t′ + P and the server
can execute again. When the last security task has finished
executing and there is no other pending task in the server, the
server will be suspended. Also, the server will become inactive
if there are no security tasks ready to execute.
There is no strict assumption on the smallest time unit of
server parameters, e.g., Q,P ∈ R+ and the security task
releases are not bound to the server [10]. Besides, we assume
that there is no no task or server release jitters.
A. Reformulation of Period Adaptation Problem using Server
Since we execute the security tasks within the server,
the constraint in Eq. (4) needs to be revised accordingly
to consider the server’s available capacity and replenishment
period. Let us denote UBS(Q,P ),ΓS as the utilization bound
for the set of security task ΓS executing within the server
with capacity Q and replenishment period5 P . Since the
server schedules the security tasks on a fixed-priority order,
we can determine the utilization bound UBS(Q,P ),ΓS using
the concept similar to that discussed in literature [11]. The
authors in work [11] represented the utilization bound as a
function of number of tasks running under the server; which
is essentially derived from the Liu and Layland’s utilization
bound [3]. In particular, when the smallest period of the
security task is greater than or equal to 3P − 2Q, the upper
bound of the utilization factor for the security tasks is given by
UBS(Q,P ),ΓS = n


(
3−
Q
P
3−2
Q
P
) 1
n
− 1

 where n is number of
5The calculation of capacity and replenishment period is discussed in
Section V.
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security tasks in the set ΓS . Hence we can define the following
constraints on utilization bound
∑
τi∈ΓS
Ci
Ti
≤ UBS(Q,P ),ΓS = n

( 3−QP
3−2
Q
P
) 1
n
− 1

 (8)
Ti ≥ 3P − 2Q ∀τi ∈ ΓS . (9)
Therefore, the period optimization problem with presence
of server can be presented similar to that of P1 except
the constraints in Eqs. (4) and (5) will be replaced by the
constraints in Eqs. (8) and (9).
B. Geometric Programming (GP) Formulation
Solving the above constraint non-linear problem is not
straightforward and it always involves compromise of accept-
ing a local instead of global solution. Therefore we reformulate
the optimization problem as a GP. The GP reformulation
allows us to solve the problem in an efficient way. When the
constraints are mutually consistent, the GP solution approach
can always finds a globally optimal solution [12]. In what
follows, we first introduce the GP framework and then show
how the period adaptation problem can be cast as a GP.
1) Geometric Programming: A non-linear optimization
problem can be solved by GP if the problem is formulated
as follows [12]
min
X
f0(x) (10a)
Subject to: fi(x) ≤ 1 i = 1, · · · , zp (10b)
gi(x) = 1 i = 1, · · · , zm (10c)
where x = [x1, x2, · · · , xz ]T denotes the vector of z opti-
mization variables. The functions f0(x), f1(x), · · · , fzp(x) are
posynomial and g1(x), · · · , gzm(x) are monomial functions,
respectively. A function gi(x) is monomial if it can be ex-
pressed as gi(x) = ci
Li∏
l=1
xall where ci ∈ R+ and al ∈ R. Note
that the coefficient ci must be non-negative but the exponents
al can be any real number including fractional and negative.
A posynomial function is the sum of the monomials, and thus
can be represented as fi(x) =
Li∑
l=1
clx
a1l
1 x
a2l
2 · · ·xa1lz where
cl ∈ R+ and ajl ∈ R. The posynomials are closed under
addition, multiplication and non-negative scaling where the
monomials are closed under multiplication and division.
2) Period Adaptation as a GP: In the following we refor-
mulate the period adaptation problem as a GP.
Observation 1. The fundamental measures, e.g.,∑
τi∈ΓS
ωi
Tdesi
Ti
=
∑
τi∈ΓS
ωiT
des
i T
−1
i and
∑
τi∈ΓS
Ci
Ti
=
∑
τi∈ΓS
CiT
−1
i in the period adaptation problem are
posynomials.
This is directly follows from the observation that all the
coefficients are non-negative and the variables (e.g., periods)
are always positive. Besides, we are only summing up positive
terms and therefore the terms are closed under addition. Since
the requirement for posynomials is that it need to be closed
under addition, the above terms are posynomials.
An interesting property of posynomials and monomials is
that, if f(·) is a posynomial and g(·) is a monomial, the ratio
f(·)
g(·) will become a posynomial. Since
f(·)
g(·) is a posynomial,
this allows us to express the constraint f(·) < g(·) as f(·)
g(·) ≤ 1.
For example, we can easily handle the constraint of the form
f(·) ≤ α where f(·) is a posynomial and α > 0. We can refer
fˆ(·) is an inverse posynomial if 1
fˆ(·)
is a posynomial. Besides,
we can maximize a non-zero posynomial objective function
by minimizing its inverse. Based on the above description, we
can reformulate the maximization problem as a standard GP
minimization problem as follows
(P2) min
T
∑
τi∈ΓS
ωi
−1(T desi )
−1
Ti (11a)
s. t.:
( ∑
τi∈ΓS
CiTi
−1
) · (UBS(Q,P ),ΓS)−1 ≤ 1 (11b)
(3P − 2Q)Ti−1 ≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ ΓS (11c)
T desi Ti
−1 ≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ ΓS (11d)
(Tmaxi )
−1Ti ≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ ΓS (11e)
where
(
UBS(Q,P ),ΓS
)−1
= 1
n




3−
Q
P
3−2
Q
P


1
n
−1


.
The GP formulation P2 is not a convex optimization
problem since the posynomials are not convex functions [12].
However, P2 can be converted into a convex optimization
problem using logarithmic transformations. The conversion P2
into a convex optimization problem is based on a logarithmic
change of variables, as well as a logarithmic transformation of
objective and constraint functions. Instead of using optimiza-
tion variable Ti let us use the logarithms, e.g., T˜i = logTi and
hence Ti = eT˜i . Besides, let us replace inequality constraints
of the form fi(·) ≤ 1 with log fi(·) ≤ 0. Using this
transformation we can express P2 as follows
(P3) min
T˜
log
∑
τi∈ΓS
eωi
−1(Tdesi )
−1
T˜i (12a)
s. t.: log e
( ∑
τi∈ΓS
CiT˜
−1
i
)
·(UBS(Q,P ),ΓS )
−1
≤ 0 (12b)
log e(3P−2Q)T˜
−1
i ≤ 0 ∀τi ∈ ΓS (12c)
log eT
des
i T˜
−1
i ≤ 0 ∀τi ∈ ΓS (12d)
log e(T
max
i )
−1T˜i ≤ 0 ∀τi ∈ ΓS (12e)
where T˜i = logTi and T˜ = [T˜1, T˜2, · · · T˜n]T. This loga-
rithomic transformation leads P3 to a convex optimization
problem with respect to new variable T˜ [12] [13, Secs. 4.5 and
3.1.5]. Since P3 is a convex optimization problem, it can be
solved using standard algorithms such as interior-point method
that is known to be solvable in polynomial time [13, Ch. 11].
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V. SELECTION OF THE SERVER PARAMETERS
The period adaptation problem in the preceding section is
derived based on a given server parameter S(Q,P ) e.g., the
utilization bound UBS(Q,P ),ΓS in constraint (12c). However,
one fundamental problem is to find a suitable pair of server
capacity Q and replenishment period P that respects the real-
time constraints of the tasks in the system. In this section,
for a given period of the security tasks, we formulate a GP
problem to determine the server parameters.
A. Linear Lower-Bound Supply Function
For the security server with unknown capacity Q and replen-
ishment period P , we can derive the lower (upper) bound of
Q (P ) that makes security tasks τi ∈ ΓS running under server
schedulable by using periodic server model introduced in lit-
erature [14] [15] [16]. The key idea from previous work is that
a task τi can be schedulable if minimum supply for the server
can match the maximum workload generated by τi and hp(τi)
during a time interval t. If the server task τS is scheduled by
a fixed-priority scheme, the minimum supply of the server is
delivered to the security tasks when its (k−1)-th execution has
just finished with minimum interference from the high-priority
real-time tasks τj ∈ ΓR. Then, the subsequent executions of
k-th release are maximally delayed by the higher-priority real-
time tasks. For this minimum supply, we can parameterize the
linear lower-bound supply function lsbfS(t) with the period
and WCET of higher-priority real-time tasks.
The worst-case response time of the server is the longest
time from the server being replenished to its capacity being ex-
hausted with the maximum interference from the high-priority
real-time tasks, given that there are security tasks ready to use
all of the server’s available capacity. In order to calculate exact
response time of the server, we can use the formula introduced
in the work [4]. Using this exact method, we can calculate the
maximum possible preemption on the server from the higher-
priority real-time tasks for a certain length of window and add
up the server’s capacity. The calculation is repeated iteratively
by increasing the window size until the window size exceeds
the server’s relative replenishment period (in this case the
system is determined to be unschedulable) or until the window
size is stable. Then, the window size is the busy period and
let us denote it as wS .
The worst case release pattern of server occurs when τS and
hp(τS) is released simultaneously. The worst-case busy period
wS is the maximum time duration that the server can take to
execute full capacity Q when it is released simultaneously with
the higher-priority real-time tasks, hp(τS) at the k-th release.
Therefore, by using the traditional exact analysis [4] the worst-
case busy period can be obtained as
wk+1S = Q+
∑
τh∈hp(τS)
⌈
wkS
Th
⌉
· Ch (13)
where w0S = Q and wS = w
k+1
S = w
k
S when it converges for
some k. Therefore the worst-case delay at the k-th release and
thereafter can be represented as
∆S =
∑
τh∈hp(τS)
⌈
wS
Th
⌉
· Ch. (14)
However, such iterative methods are only amenable to brute-
force approach. This is because, the ceiling function with
unknown value (e.g., the busy period) can not be in our for-
mulation. Thus we take a different approach by approximating
∆S . During a time interval of P , the maximum workload
generated by the server and higher-priority real-time tasks can
be represented by
wS = Q+
∑
τh∈hp(τS)
⌈
P
Th
⌉
· Ch. (15)
Thus using Eq. (15), we can avoid the iterative calculation
by assuming the number of invocation of higher-priority
real-time tasks during P , not during the exact busy period
of the server. Since ⌈y⌉ ≤ y + 1, we linearize wS by
removing the ceiling function and represent Eq. (15) as
wS = Q +
∑
τh∈hp(τS)
(
P
Th
+ 1
)
· Ch. Therefore, the worst-
case linear lower-bound supply function of the security server
during a time interval t [14] is given by
lsbfS(t) =
Q
P
[t− (P −Q)−∆S ] (16)
where ∆S =
∑
τh∈hp(τS)
(
P
Th
+ 1
)
· Ch.
B. Sufficient Bound for Schedulability of the Security Tasks
In order to derive the minimum capacity that guarantees to
schedule τi ∈ ΓS , let us consider the situation when τi barely
meets it deadline at t = Di with the worst-case interference
from high-priority security tasks, hp(τi) ∈ ΓS . Let us now
define the critical instantof the security tasks, e.g., the worst-
case response time of τi when τi and hp(τi) are released
simultaneously at the end of server’s (k− 1)-th execution and
suffer worst-case preemptions from k-th release and thereafter
[16]. Let us denote Ii as the worst-case workload generated
by the τi and hp(τi) from critical instant to deadline of τi
given by
Ii = Ci +
∑
τh∈hp(τi)
⌈
Di
Th
⌉
· Ch. (17)
In order to ensure the schedulability of the security task τi, the
minimum supply delivered by the server has to be greater than
or equal to the worst-case workload during the time interval
Di, e.g.,
lsbfS(Di) ≥ Ii ∀τi ∈ ΓS (18)
where lsbfS(·) is given by Eq. (16).
It is worth noting that Eq. (18) is only a sufficient and not
necessary condition. The security task τi can be schedulable
if and only if there exists a time instance t ≤ Di such
that the inequality in Eq. (18) holds. However, we use the
sufficient condition in Eq. (18) because the presence of time
in the necessary condition makes the proposed optimization
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framework inapplicable to the problem under consideration.
Despite the fact that this bound may not be exact and may
incur approximation error in the supply function, as we show
in Sections VII and VIII, it enables us to ensure opportunistic
execution of the security tasks without violating real-time
constraints.
C. Formulation as an Optimization Problem
In the following we present the optimization problem for-
mulation to determine the server parameters Q and P .
1) Objective Function: The objective of periodic monitor-
ing in the system is to ensure maximal processor utilization for
the security tasks, without violating the real-time constraints
of the system. Therefore, we define the objective function as
follows
max
Q,P
Q
P
(19)
where the server parameters, Q and P are the optimization
variables.
2) Server Schedulability Constraint: A server is schedula-
ble if worst-case response time of the server does not exceed
its replenishment period [10]. Hence we represent the server
schdulability constraint as follows
Q+
∑
τh∈hp(τS)
(
P
Th
+ 1
)
· Ch ≤ P. (20)
3) Server Bound Constraints: As we have discussed in
Section V-B, in order to guarantee schedulability of each of the
security tasks τi ∈ ΓS , the linear lower-bound supply function
must be greater than or equal to worst-case workload during
the time interval Di. Therefore, from Eq. (18) the constraints
on the server supply bound to ensure schedulability of the
security tasks can be expressed as
Q
P
[Di − (P −Q)−∆S ] ≥ Ii ∀τi ∈ ΓS (21)
where T desi ≤ Di = T ∗i ≤ Tmaxi and T ∗i is obtained by
solving the period adaptation problem P3. Notice that, in Eq.
(21) Ii = Ci+
∑
τh∈hp(τi)
⌈
T∗i
Th
⌉
·Ch is the worst-case workload
generated by τi and hp(τi) during the time interval of T ∗i .
This is a constant for a given input.
D. Geometric Programming Formulation
Proposition 1. The objective function in Eq. (19) and the
constraint in Eq. (20) can be expressed in posynomial form.
Proof: The proof follows by rearranging the terms in
posynomial form and transform the objective function in
Eq. (19) into minimization expression. For details refer to
Appendix A.
With a view to expressing the server bound constraint as
posynomial form, we can rearrange Eq. (21) as follows
P (Q+ Ii) + ∆SQ
Q(Q+ T ∗i )
≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ ΓS . (22)
Recall that, in order to represent the constraint of the form
f(·)
g(·) ≤ 1 the denominator must be monomial. However, the
inequality in (22) does not conform to a posynomial form
due to the posymolial term in the denominator, e.g., Q(Q +
T ∗i ) = Q
2 +QT ∗i . The following theorem illustrates how the
constraints on server bound can be represented in posymonial
form.
Theorem 1. The server bound constraints can be formulated
as the following posynomial form
[P (Q+ Ii) + ∆SQ]·[Q · gˆ(Q, T ∗i )]−1 ≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ ΓS . (23)
Proof: The theorem is proved by using the geometric
mean approximation [17, Ch. 2] of posynomials. For detailed
proof refer to Appendix B.
Using the logarithmic transformation presented in Section
IV-B2, we can formulate server parameter selection problem
as a GP in convex form as follows
(P4) min
Q˜,P˜
log eQ˜
−1P˜ (24a)
s. t.: log e
[
Q˜+
∑
τh∈hp(τS )
(P˜+Th)·T
−1
h
·Ch
]
·P˜−1
≤ 0 (24b)
log e[P˜ (Q˜+Ii)+∆SQ˜]·[Q˜·gˆ(Q˜,T
∗
i )]
−1
≤ 0 ∀τi ∈ ΓS (24c)
where Q˜ = logQ and P˜ = logP . Since P4 is a convex
optimization problem, it is solvable using standard algorithm
such as interior-point method.
VI. ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT
We develop an iterative scheme to obtain the period of the
security tasks and the server parameters jointly. The overall
procedure, as summarized in Algorithm 1 works as follows.
The algorithm starts with the maximum allowable periods
(e.g., Tmaxi ) and try to find the Q and P by solving the server
parameter selection problem P4. If there is no solution, which
implies that the constraints in P4 are mutually inconsistent,
it is not possible to provide a server for the security tasks
without violating the real-time constraints of the system. Since
it is then not possible to integrate security tasks in the given
system, the algorithm reports the set of real-time and security
tasks as unschedulable.
If there is a solution, we iteratively estimate the best
period for the security tasks (Lines 8-26). In particular, for
the given server parameter Q(j) and P (j) for any iteration
j, the algorithm estimates the periods for next iteration by
solving P3. Likewise, for a given period vector, we calcu-
late the best server parameters that make the constraints on
P4 mutually consistent. Let η(j) be the objective value by
solving P3 at iteration j. The iteration is repeated as long
as the difference of objective value in successive iterations
is greater than some predefined tolerance for convergence ǫ,
e.g., |η(j)−η(j−1)| > ǫ or the maximum allowable iteration
counter Jmax is not exceeded. From our experiments we find
that, the algorithm generally converged within 3-5 iterations
for most of the schedulable task-sets with tolerance ǫ = 10−16.
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Recall that, the approximation quality of gˆ(Q˜, T ∗i ) [e.g.,
constraint (24c) in P4] depends on the choice of y0. Thus, in
the optimization procedure (e.g., Line 3 and 18), we iteratively
approximate gˆ(Q˜, T ∗i ) by updating a and b according to the
intermediate solution of Q˜. That is, until the objective value
converges, we use Q˜ at k-th step as y0 at (k + 1)-th step. In
our experiments, we choose the initial value of y0 as 1, and
the objective value of P4 converged within 5 iterations.
Algorithm 1 Security Period and Server Parameter Selection
Input: Set of real-time and security tasks, ΓR and ΓS , respectively
Output: The tuple {T∗, Q∗, P ∗}, e.g., periods of the security tasks and the
server parameters if the task-set is schedulable; Unscheduable otherwise
1: Initialize j := 1
2: Initialize security task’s period vector T(j) := [Tmaxi ]T∀τi∈ΓS
3: For the given T(j), Solve P4 to obtain server parameters
4: if no solution found then
5: /* not possible to integrate security tasks in the system */
6: return Unscheduable
7: else
8: Set Q(j) = Q∗, P (j) = P∗ where Q∗, P∗ be the solution from P4
9: while period perturbations are not minimized and j < Jmax do
10: Update j := j + 1
11: Solve the period adaptation problem P3 using server parameters
Q(j − 1), P (j − 1)
12: if no solution found then
13: /* return current best solution */
14: Set T(j) := T(j− 1), Q(j) := Q(j− 1), P (j) := P (j− 1)
15: break
16: end if
17: Update the period vector T(j) := T∗ where T∗ is the solution
obtained from P3
18: For the given T(j), Solve P4 to obtain server parameters
19: if no solution found then
20: /* return current best solution */
21: Set Q(j) := Q(j − 1), P (j) := P (j − 1)
22: break
23: end if
24: Update the server parameters Q(j) := Q∗, P (j) := P∗
25: end while
26: return {T∗ := T(j), Q∗ := Q(j), P ∗ := P (j)}
27: end if
VII. EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of our proposed opportunistic
monitoring model, we performed experiments using randomly
generated workloads. The parameters used in our evaluation
are summarized in Table III.
TABLE III
EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS
Parameter Values
Number of real-time tasks, m [3, 10]
Number of security tasks, n [2, 5]
Real-time task period, Ti [10ms, 100ms]
Desired period for security tasks, T desi [250ms, 500ms]
Maximum allowable period, Tmaxi [5000ms, 5050ms]
Tolerance for convergence, ǫ 10−16
Maximum replenishment period (for ex-
haustive search), Pmax
2500
Exhaustive search granularity, δ 0.5
A. Evaluation Setup
The base-utilization of a task-set is defined as the total sum
of the task utilizations. The real-time and security task-sets are
grouped by base-utilization from [0.01 + 0.1 · i, 0.1 + 0.1 · i]
where i ∈ Z and the number of base-utilization groups are
specified in the corresponding experiments. This allows us
to generate task-sets with an even distribution of tasks. Each
task-set instance contains [3, 10] real-time and [2, 5] security
tasks. Each real-time task τi ∈ ΓR has a period Ti ∈
[10ms, 100ms]. The desired and maximum allowable periods
for the security tasks are selected from [250ms, 500ms] and
[5000ms, 5050ms], respectively.
The utilization of the real-time and security tasks are gen-
erated by the UUniFast [18] algorithm. For a given utilization
Ui, the execution time of τi is generated by Ci = UiTi. We
use GGPLAB [19] to solve the GPs. All the experiments are
performed on Intel Pentium N3530 2.16 GHz processor with
4 GB RAM.
B. Results
1) Comparison with Exact Method: We compare our GP-
based approach with an exhaustive search method6 based on
exact analysis. In this exhaustive search, we assign server
replenishment period from 1 to Pmax with a granularity
of δ. For each period, we determine the minimum capacity
requirements that makes the tasks schedulable. From the set
of feasible period and capacity pair, we take the pair that
maximizes the server utilization. Notice that, the minimum
server capacity Qmin(τi, P ) for τi ∈ ΓS with a given P can
be obtained by solving the quadratic inequality in Eq. (21),
which is given by
Qmin(τi, P ) =
−(Di−P−∆S)+
√
(Di−P−∆S)
2+4IiP
2 . (25)
In the above equation ∆S is calculated by exact method,
e.g., ∆S =
∑
τh∈hp(τS)
⌈
wS
Th
⌉
· Ch where wS is obtained from
Eq. (13). In order to find the minimum required capacity of
the server for a given replenishment period P , we take the
maximum of the capacity Qmin(τi, P ) over all the security
tasks τi ∈ ΓS which is defined as
Qmin(P ) = max
τi∈ΓS
{Qmin(τi, P )} . (26)
Hence any Q from [Qmin(P ), P ] such that Q+∆S ≤ P will
be the feasible capacity that makes the task-set schedulable.
In Fig. 1 we compare the number of schedulable task-
sets found in the proposed method and exhaustive search.
For exhaustive search, we set Pmax = 2500 with granularity
δ = 0.5. As we can see from figure, the difference in terms of
schchdulable task-sets found by exhaustive search compared to
GP increases for higher base-utilization. We can attribute that
due to approximation of supply function in the security server.
Recall that, the exhaustive search method calculates minimum
capacity of the server by exact analysis of the busy period. In
6Similar search method has also been discussed in literature [10], [14],
[16].
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from [0.11, 0.20]. For exhaustive search, we set Pmax = 2500 with search
granularity δ = 0.5.
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Fig. 2. Exhaustive search vs. proposed approach: difference in the server
utilization for schedulable task-sets. For each utilization group, we randomly
generate 100 task-sets and compare the schedulability of both schemes.
contrast, the proposed method approximates the interference
to the server from real-time tasks during the interval of server
replenishment period and linearize it by taking the ceiling off.
While this approximation error is small for low utilization
cases, as the base-utilization increases the error accumulates
and reduces schedulability. However, still it is possible to
accumulate task-sets for higher base-utilization.
The quality of solution (e.g., server utilization) obtained by
GP and exhaustive search is illustrated in Fig. 2. The z-axis
in this figure represents the difference in server utilization,
e.g.,
(
QEX
PEX
− QGP
PGP
)
where QEX and QGP (PEX and PGP)
represent the capacity (replenishment period) obtained from
exhaustive search and proposed method, respectively. For low-
to-medium utilization cases, the difference is close to zero,
which implies the quality of the solution obtained by the GP
method is similar to that of obtained by exhaustive search.
However, when the utilization is higher the exhaustive search
outperforms the proposed method. Again, we can attribute this
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Fig. 3. The effectiveness of security is measured as ξ = ‖T
∗−Tdes‖2
‖Tmax−Tdes‖2
.
The base-utilization of the real-time tasks are taken from [0.31, 0.4] and the
base-utilization of the security tasks are varied from [0.01+0.1·i,0.1+0.1·i]
where 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, i ∈ Z. Hence the total utilization of the system varied from
[0.3, 0.8]. Each utilization group contains 100 task-sets.
due to the approximation of supply function in the security
server.
It is worth noting that the solution obtained by exhaustive
search may not be optimal in a sense that the actual replenish-
ment period may appear beyond Pmax. As we can see from
Fig. 2, for some task-sets the difference is less than zero, e.g.,
QEX
PEX
is lower than Q
GP
PGP
. We highlight that the actual search
region to find the optimal server parameters for exhaustive
search may widely vary based on task-set inputs; and can only
be found numerically by trial-and-error. Instead, the proposed
method provides a generic approach to analyze the system that
is independent of task-set input parameters.
We note that the proposed GP-based approach can solve a
given task-set in seconds, while the exhaustive search method
generally takes few minutes to couple of hours depending on
the size of Pmax and the search granularity δ. Besides, the
exhaustive search method is not scalable for task-sets with
large number of tasks.
2) Effectiveness of Security: In Fig. 3, we observe the
effectiveness of security of the system by means of tightness of
the desired periods, e.g., ξ = ‖T
∗−Tdes‖2
‖Tmax−Tdes‖2
where T∗ is the
solution obtained from Algorithm 1, Tdes = [T desi ]T∀τi∈ΓS
and Tmax = [Tmaxi ]T∀τi∈ΓS are the desired and maximum
period vector, respectively, and ‖·‖2 denotes the Euclidean
norm. The closer the value of ξ to 0, the nearer the period
of each of the security task is to the desired period. Each of
the data point in Fig. 3 represents schedulable task-sets. We
find that most cases the algorithm finds the periods that is
within 20% of the desired period value.
We note that, our GP approach took 5.33 second on average
with 23.33 standard deviation to analyze a set of tasks with
parameters specified by Table III. Thus, the proposed approach
solves problems of reasonable size in seconds, which is an
acceptable amount of time for offline analysis.
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3) Experiment with a Security Application: With a view to
observing that whether the security tasks can perform desired
checking after period adaptation, we perform experiments
with Tripwire in RTAI-patched Linux RTOS. For this, we
purposely compromise one of the tasks and launch the attack
by modifying the contents in the /sbin directory. For each of
the experiments run, we start with a clean system state, launch
attack at any random point of the task execution and log the
cycle count requires to detect the attack by Tripwire. We obtain
the periods by solving the period adaptation problem and set it
as the period of Tripwire in the RTOS. For non-adaptive case,
period of Tripwire is set to Tmaxi . Each of the bars in the
x-axis of Fig. 4 denotes individual experiment run, and y-axis
shows the corresponding cycle counts to detect the attack. As
shown in Fig. 4, out of 10 experiments we find 3 instances,
where the non-adaptive period assignment outperforms. This is
mainly because the actual time to detect the attacks depends on
when the attack is launched and the corresponding scheduling
point of the security routine. However in general case, the
proposed period adaptation mechanism provides better moni-
toring frequency and hence it is more likely to detect breaches
as soon the attack is launched.
VIII. LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
While the proposed method provides an approach for inte-
grating security in RTS and a metric to measure the effective-
ness of such security integration, there are still some areas for
improvement for the mechanisms presented in this paper. The
proposed server-based approach imposes additional constraints
on periodic monitoring compared to non-server case and also
based on approximation of supply function in the security
server which somewhat limits schedulability. However, as we
discuss in the following, the proposed frameworks allows us
to provide better control in terms of security enforcement.
Aforesaid, in order to integrate security policy into the
system along with monitoring frequency, other performance
aspects such as responsiveness and atomicity of the security
tasks also need to be considered. While the proposed server-
based method provides us a first step to ensure periodic moni-
toring, this approach can be extended to satisfy responsiveness
and atomicity properties as well.
In the case when responsiveness and atomicity of the se-
curity mechanism should be ensured, the proposed framework
can be modified as follows. Whilst the security task requires
better responsiveness and/or needs to perform special atomic
operation, the priority of the server can be increased to a
priority that is strictly higher than all (or some) of the real-
time tasks, depending on the requirements of the security
event. Besides, if the security task running under server is
not the highest-priority security task, the priority of that task
itself is also increased. If the server’s capacity is exhausted
while executing any atomic operation or fine-grained checking,
we allow the server to overrun, e.g., the server continues to
execute at the same priority until the security checking is
completed. When the server overruns, the allocated capacity
at the start of the next server replenishment period is reduced
by the amount of the overrun.
It is worth mentioning that, the cost of responsiveness and
atomicity by means of priority inversion will be reflected by
compromising the timing constraints of some of the real-time
tasks. In such cases, the schedulability analysis need to be
performed considering maximum blocking time of the security
events. Besides, The scheduling policy should identify which
real-time or security tasks can be dropped to provide better
trade-off between control system performance and defense
against security vulnerabilities. In addition, depending on the
actual implementations of the security routines, the scheduling
framework may need to follow certain precedence constraints.
Analogous to the task example illustrated in Table I, in order to
ensure that the security application has not been compromised,
the security application’s own binary may be scanned first
before checking the system binary or library files. We intend
to explore these aspects in our future work.
IX. RELATED WORK
Despite the fact that malware developers and sophisticated
adversaries are able to overcome air-gaps, most RTS were con-
sidered to be invulnerable against software security breaches;
and until recently security issues in RTS were not exten-
sively discussed in industry or academia. The issues regarding
information leakage through storage timing channels using
architectural resources (e.g., caches) shared between real-time
tasks with different security levels is considered in the work
[8], [9]. The authors proposed a modification to the fixed-
priority scheduling algorithm and introduced a state cleanup
mechanism to mitigate information leakage through shared
resources. The cost paid for enforcing security mechanism is
the reduced schedulability of overall system.
There has been some work [6], [7] on reconciling the
addition of security mechanisms into real-time systems that
considered periodic task scheduling where each task requires
a security service whose overhead varies according to the
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quantifiable level of the service. A new scheduler [6] and en-
hancements to existing EDF scheduler [7] is proposed to meet
real-time requirements while maximizing the level of security
achieved. In contrast, we consider a fixed-priority scheduling
mechanism where security policies are executed sporadically
using a server while meeting real-time requirements.
Although not in the context of security in RTS, a similar
line of work to ours exists where the authors statically assign
the periods for multiple independent control tasks considering
control delay as a cost metric [20]. The cost functions are
assumed to be linear in task periods. The control delay is
estimated using an approximate response-time analysis and the
authors presented an iterative procedure, where the actual (e.g.,
nonlinear) cost functions are linearized around the current
solution in each step. In contrast, our goal is to ensure security
of the system without violating timing constraints of the real-
time tasks. Hence, instead of minimizing response time, our
goal is to assign best possible periods, so that the perturbation
between achievable period and desired period is minimized for
all the security tasks.
The notion of randomization has been used in litera-
ture [21] with a view to hardening security mechanisms by
minimizing predictability of deterministic RTS schedulers.
The authors proposed a schedule obfuscation method that
aimed at randomizing the task schedule while providing the
necessary real-time guarantees for safe operation. It is not
inconceivable that the randomization protocol in the work
[21] is complementary to those presented here and can be
adopted to the proposed framework in order to make the
system robust against attackers. Different from our work at
the scheduler level, architectural frameworks e.g., [22], [23]
aim to create hardware/software mechanisms to protect against
security vulnerabilities. It is worth mentioning that these two
sets of approaches could be combined to make the RTS more
resilient to attacks.
X. CONCLUSION
The evidence from recent successful attacks on automobiles
[24], industrial control systems [25] and UAVs [26] indicate
that RTS are not invulnerable to security breaches. In this work
we are stepping towards developing an integrated security-
aware RTS and provide a glimpse of security design metrics
for RTS. By using approaches such as the ones presented in
this paper, designers of RTS are now able to improve their
security posture and consequently safety – which is the main
goal for such systems. This is also a step towards developing
security metrics for the field of systems security in general.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let us rearrange Eq. (19) as QP−1 which is clearly a
posynomial. In order to reform the objective function in Eq.
(19) as a standard GP minimization problem, we can rewrite
Eq. (19) as
min
Q,P
Q−1P (27)
which is also in posynomial form. Let us now rearrange Eq.
(20) as follows
(Q +∆S)P
−1 ≤ 1 (28)
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where ∆S =
∑
τh∈hp(τS)
(P + Th) · T−1h · Ch. Since the opti-
mization variables (e.g., capacity and replenishment period)
are always positive, using the similar argument presented in
Observation 1, we can assert that Eq. (28) is a posynomial
constraint.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the theorem using the geometric mean approx-
imation [17, Ch. 2]. Since the denominator in Eq. (22) is a
posynomial, let us approximate Q+ T ∗i with a monomial by
the following geometric mean approximation.
Let us denote Q+T ∗i as g(Q, T ∗i ) = u1(Q)+u2(T ∗i ) where
u1(Q) = Q and u2(T ∗i ) = T ∗i . We can approximate g(Q, T ∗i )
with
gˆ(Q, T ∗i ) =
[
u1(Q)
a
]a
·
[
u2(T
∗
i )
b
]b
(29)
where a = u1(y0)
g(y0,T∗i )
, b =
u2(T
∗
i )
g(y0,T∗i )
and y0 ∈ R+ is a con-
stant that satisfies gˆ(y0, T ∗i ) = g(y0, T ∗i ). The approximated
monomial gˆ(Q, T ∗i ) can be rewritten as
gˆ(Q, T ∗i ) =
(
Q
a
)a
·
(
T ∗i
b
)b
(30)
where a = y0
y0+T∗i
, b =
T∗i
y0+T∗i
. Using this monomial approxi-
mation, we can represent Eq. (22) as
P (Q+ Ii) + ∆SQ
Q · gˆ(Q, T ∗i )
≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ ΓS (31)
and the proof follows.
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